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ABSTRACT
In this article, based on an address to the India Law Institute in New Delhi, the 
author, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia lists ten features of the 
constitutions of Australia and India that exhibit similarities; ten features 
where there are sometimes marked differences; and two areas of operation that 
illustrate the fact that especially in constitutional adjudication, judicial decision-
makers judicial decision-makers face what Julius Stone described as ‘leeways for 
choice’. By reference to decisions in Australia and India on issues of race, 
aboriginality and human sexuality, the article identifies the inescapable challenge 
of choice and suggests useful guideposts.
Keywords: Comparison of the Constitutions of Australia and India; constitutional 
adjudication; issues of race, aboriginality and human sexuality.
CONSTITUTIONAL SIMILARITIES
1. Constitutional Democracies: India and Australia occupy large portions of 
the landmass of planet Earth. India is described as a ‘sub-continent’. Australia 
commonly calls itself a ‘continent’, although some reflect this is pretension to view 
it as part of the continent of ‘Oceania’. However that may be, both India and 
Australia are large portions of the world governed as a single nation. Moreover, 
they are both parliamentary democracies. Their national governments are elected 
by direct popular vote in national polls conducted by secret ballot in which the 
* Text on which was based an address at the India Law Institute, New Delhi, 10 January 
2018.
** Former Justice of the High Court of Australia. Honorary Adjunct Professor O P Jindal 
Global University, Delhi, 2018 and Hon. LLD National Law School of India University, 
Bangalore, 1997.
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electors participate at regular intervals.1 The peaceful and substantially uncontested 
conduct of national elections in India is a great achievement of the constitution. So 
it is in Australia. Since 1923, in that country, voting in federal elections has been 
compulsory for all electors. Defaulters are subject to a small fine. In both countries, 
the electoral turnout is high.
2. Federal System: India and Australia have federal systems of government. 
Although the federal character is more clearly stamped on the Australian 
constitutional system, in practice judicial interpretations of the Australian 
Constitution have repeatedly favoured the accretion of constitutional powers to the 
Federal Parliament.2 In the Australian Constitution a list of specified legislative 
powers are granted to the Federal Parliament. Unless and until exercised by the 
Federal Parliament, the enumerated legislative powers remain with the states (and 
self-governing territories).3 A limited list of powers are conferred exclusively on the 
Australian Federal Parliament.4 In India, the generally geographical distribution 
and limitation of powers is provided for.5 The Union Parliament has exclusive 
powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the ‘Union 
List’ in the schedule.6 In India, there is also a ‘Concurrent List’ in respect of which 
the Parliament and the Legislature of any state share specified powers.7 As well, 
the Legislature of any state has exclusive power to make laws for such state, or any 
part thereof, with respect to the matters enumerated in the ‘State List’.8 
Although the federal division of powers in India is an important feature of the 
Constitution, its federal character is not amongst the stated essential characteristics 
1 In India the House of the People of Parliament (Lok Sabha) has a maximum ordinary 
term of six years (originally five years). Indian Constitution [IC], article 83(2) as altered 
by Forty-fourth Amendment Act 1978 (In). In the Australian Constitution [AC], the House 
of Representatives serves for a maximum term of three years ‘and no longer’: AC 
section 28. The Australian Senate’s ordinary term is six years: AC section 7. In India, the 
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) members also have a six-year term; although one-third of 
members retire at the end of each two year intervals: IC article 83(1).
2 See for example Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd 
(Engineers Case) [1920] 28 CLR 129, (1921) 29 CLR 406. See also New South Wales v 
The Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) [2006] 229 CLR 1.
3 AC (n 1) section 51. See also section 109.
4 AC (n 1) section 52.
5 IC (n 1) article 245.
6 Ibid article 246(1). See also the Union List (List I) in IC, 7th Schedule.
7 IC (n 1) article 246(2). See also IC, List III, 7th Schedule (‘Concurrent List’).
8 IC (n 1) article 246(3), List II.
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in the Preamble (‘… A sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic’).9 The 
comparative ease of amendment of the Indian Constitution, through parliamentary 
procedures, has reduced the significance of the federal divisions because they can 
be altered more quickly and readily than under the federal constitutions of the 
United States of America, Canada, Australia and Nigeria. 
3. Rule of Law: In both India and Australia, the rule of law is a strong feature 
of constitutionalism. In India, there is an express feature of the Constitution that 
establishes the Supreme Court of India10 and the High Courts of the states.11 The 
law declared by the Supreme Court of India is binding on all courts in the territory 
of India.12 The law declared by a High Court is binding on all subordinate courts 
within the state.13
There are no exactly similar provisions in the Australian Constitution, although 
there is a separate chapter of the Constitution, Ch. III, dealing with ‘the Judicature’. 
This separate treatment has been held to have important consequences for the 
independence, work and role of the courts in Australia.14 The rule upholding the 
superiority of judicial determinations as to the constitutionality and lawfulness of 
federal, state and territorial laws in Australia was derived from a constitutional 
holding copied from the Supreme Court of the United States.15 In this sense, in 
both countries, the courts are accepted as having the power to disallow federal 
legislative, executive and judicial acts. Thus the Supreme Court and, within 
jurisdiction, the State Courts are the independent, neutral arbitrators of 
constitutional and other legal questions. Their orders are obeyed as an attribute of 
constitutional obedience. Rarely indeed is it necessary to invoke an official to 
enforce the law against legislative or executive recalcitrance.16 
9 IC (n 1) Preamble.
10 IC (n 1) Ch IV.
11 IC (n 1) Ch V.
12 IC (n 1) article 141.
13 IC (n 1) article 226. See also East India Commercial Co v Collector of Customs [1962] 
SC 1895.
14 R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia [1956] 94 CLR 254.
15 Marbury v Madison [1803] 1 Cranch 137. This was the first Supreme Court decision in 
the United States to apply the doctrine of judicial review as to the validity of a congressional 
statute. The decision was copied in the earliest days of the High Court of Australia. See 
also Ah Yick v Lehmert [1905] 2 CLR 593; ex parte Whybrow [1910] 11 CLR 1.
16 See however Tait v The Queen [1962] 108 CLR 620, a case of a clash between the High 
Court of Australia and the Executive of the State of Victoria concerning enforcement of a 
death sentence pending disposal of an appeal application.
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4. Character of Supreme Court: As well, in both India and Australia, the 
appellate jurisdiction is integrated. The Supreme Court is not confined (as in the 
United States) substantially to federal constitutional and legal issues and orders. 
As in the United Kingdom and Canada, the final national court is a general court 
of law, resolving both constitutional and general legal disputes and those arising in 
state as well as federal jurisdiction. The general nature of the courts’ jurisdiction 
has influenced the character and self-perception of the final national court and the 
techniques of reasoning and argumentation.
5. Responsible and Representative Government: Although India has a 
President, its system of government is essentially parliamentary, not presidential. 
The President must, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with [the] 
advice [given by the Government].17 As that great judge of the Supreme Court of 
India, V R Krishna Iyer, observed in Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab, ‘not the 
Potomac, but the Thames, fertilises the flow of the Yamuna’.18
In the Australian Constitution, the Governor-General is provided for in terms 
that likewise (with due adaptations) follow the British Constitution. The executive 
power of the Commonwealth is ‘vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the 
Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth’.19
Although there is a separation of powers in the Australian and Indian 
Constitutions, between the Executive and Legislative powers respectively as there 
specified, there is no strict separation between the Executive power and the 
Legislature. The Prime Minister and the Government are elected by the members 
of the lower House of Parliament. However, both in India and Australia there is 
provided a short period of grace. In the Australian Constitution it is stated that 
‘no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless 
he is or becomes a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives’.20 In 
India, it is provided ‘a Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is 
not a member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period 
cease to be a Minister’.21 Both in India and Australia, the Prime Minister is 
formally appointed by the Head of State (the President or in Australia the 
17 IC (n 1) article 74.
18 Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab AIR [1974] SC 2192, 2212 cf. M D Kirby, ‘Foreword’ 
in Lokendra Malik, Selected Reflections on the Indian Presidency: Essay in honour of 
President Shri Pranab Mukherjee (Satyam Law International 2017) vii.
19 AC (n 1) section 61.
20 Ibid section 64.
21 IC (n 1) article 75(5).
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Governor-General representing the Queen). However, in Australia, the Prime 
Minister is not mentioned in the Constitution, although constitutionally he or she 
is the most important politician and political leader in the country. In India, the 
Prime Minister is the head of the Council of Ministers22 and is expressly named 
in the text. In Australia, whilst a Federal Executive Council is provided for to 
‘advise the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth’23 the 
selection, appointment and termination of appointment are left to the vestigial 
provisions of the Royal Prerogative. In India there is an express duty upon the 
Prime Minister to furnish evidence to the President as to all decisions of the 
Council of Ministers.24 In Australia, that duty also is governed by established 
conventions and traditions. 
Under both constitutions, the role of the President or the Governor-General, 
like that of the British Sovereign, is in the words of Walter Bagehot ‘to advise, 
encourage and warn’25 the ministers in respect of the advice which they give to 
him or her. Whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy, the powers given to 
the symbolic head of the Executive are not those of a ‘rubber stamp or a glorified 
cypher’.26 In neither Constitution is there an express power in the President or the 
Governor-General to dismiss a Prime Minister for a perceived breach of duty.27 In 
India, it is said that such power resides in Parliament. But in Australia, it has been 
exercised by the Governor-General and by State Governors, invoking the Royal 
Prerogative, said to be implied by the role, title and functions of the Vice Regal 
representatives.28
22 IC (n 1) article 74(1) cf. Government of India Act 1935 (UK), sections 10(4) and 51(4).
23 AC (n 1) section 62. These gave rise to the controversy, in November 1975, when 
Governor-General Kerr terminated the commission appointing E G Whitlam as Prime 
Minister of Australia, notwithstanding that he continued to enjoy the support of a majority 
in the House of Representatives. The Governor-General then appointed the Leader of the 
Opposition (M Fraser) as caretaker Prime Minister on condition that he would secure 
supply and proceed immediately to a federal election (which he did and in which he was 
returned to office).
24 IC (n 1) article 78.
25 Shamsher Singh (n 18) 2212. See also Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 
(Chapman and Hall 1867, Fontana Press 1991) 113 on the right of the President of India to 
relevant information. See also Malik (n 18) 94–95. See also IC (n 1) article 78.
26 Malik (n 18) 94.
27 Malik (n 18) 104.
28 The Kerr/Whitlam Case (1975) was preceded in Canada by the case of Governor-
General Lord Byng of Vimy and Prime Minister McKenzie-King (1926) and by a case in 
New South Wales, Australia in 1932 (Governor of Philip Game and State Premier J Lang). 
See also Kirby (n 18) ix.
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The United States Constitution, on the other hand, was greatly influenced by 
the then unevolved version of the British Constitution as understood by the 
American settlers at the time of the American revolution. The President was 
modelled on the British monarch who, at the time, was often an active and powerful 
head of the Executive. Subsequent to 1776, the British Constitution continued to 
evolve to the form of constitutional monarch recognised today. That form 
emphasises the predominance of Parliament. The Westminster system affords a 
more swift and flexible means of terminating an incompetent, unpopular or 
misbehaving head of government. The resulting political system chooses its 
leaders from politicians who have typically already been tested in the parliamentary 
chamber. It is less prone to executive autocracy. Whilst it has its own weaknesses, 
most observers, including some in the United States today, consider it a preferable, 
flexible form of government, when contrasted to the presidential system.29
1. Separating head of state and government: Consequent on the previous point 
of similarity, is the way the Indian and Australian forms of constitutional 
government separate the ceremonial, military and bureaucratic functions of the 
chief executive from the functions of Head of Government.30 The differentiation is 
expressly reflected in the Indian Constitution by the description and powers of the 
President and Prime Minister. The head of state enjoys control over the grant of 
pardons and commutation of sentences.31 It is a considerable burden to impose on 
one individual (even enjoying powers of delegation) to perform so many time-
consuming functions where the powers of head of state and head of government 
are combined as in most presidential models. Simply receiving the credentials of 
diplomats, participating in military and civil ceremonies, retaining engagement 
with huge modern bureaucracies and being involved with the vast modern civil 
society consume inordinate time. Such functions necessarily distract the political 
head of government from the burdensome functions of actual political, economic 
and social leadership. They also combine in the one-person functions that are 
designed to be uniting, neutral and shared by all people with functions that tend to 
be contested and even divisive, concerning the economic, political and social 
differences that inevitably exist in a modern society. 
29 Professor Bruce Ackerman (Yale University) has written on the advantages of the 
parliamentary system. Many consider that the model of Executive President places 
impossible and undue demands on the Chief Executive.
30 IC (n 1) article 53(1) and (2). See also article 74, 75 and 78. Cf. AC (n 1) sections 61, 68 
and 70.
31 IC (n 1) article 72(1).
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In this sense, the differentiation in functions, reflected in the parliamentary 
system operating in India and Australia, is more apt to the modern age and to the 
functions of the two offices. In essence, those functions are separate and different. 
The proper place for the head of government is in the place where political 
government mostly goes on, namely parliament. The proper place for the head of 
state is in the Chief Executive’s mansion. Moreover, conferring on a head of 
government of the role of commander-in-chief of the military forces may be 
prone to result in false or undesirable opinions to be formed as to the ambit and 
availability of such powers. The lesson of history is that it is preferable to keep 
them separated.32
2. Legal traditions: Many of the distinctive legal traditions of India and 
Australia are identical or similar. The judges of the superior courts are commonly 
respected and uncorrupted. The robes of judges and advocates are similar, 
especially now that Justices of the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of 
Australia and other courts have dispensed with the wearing of wigs. Judges are 
given deferential titles (in India ‘My Lord’ and in Australia ‘Your Honour’). Under 
the provisions of the respective constitutions, the appointment of superior court 
judges is made by the Executive Government. Except that the members of the 
Executive must participate in and be answerable to Parliament, there is no 
provision akin to engagement with the legislature in the confirmation of judicial 
appointments as for federal judges in the United States.33 The sole obligation upon 
the Executive in India is to ‘consult’ with judges, including always in the case of 
the appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice of India to consult with the 
holder of that office.34 
In Australia, the Executive power of appointment is, so far as the Constitution 
is concerned, plenary and uncontrolled.35 A statutory provision in Australia now 
requires ‘consultation’ with state governments in respect to appointments to the 
High Court of Australia.36 Whereas in Australia, ‘consultation’ means just that 
and implies a serious but not binding process of discussion, in India, as a result of 
the Judges Cases the requirement of ‘consultation’ has (by a narrow judicial 
majority) been held to afford a virtual veto to the Chief Justice or to a Collegium 
32 IC (n 1) article 53(2); AC (n 1) section 68.
33 IC (n 1) article 124(2).
34 Ibid.
35 AC (n 1) section 72(2).
36 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), section 6 (‘Consultation with State Attorneys-
General on appointment of Justices’).
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of senior justices. Justice Krishna Iyer criticised this as a ‘judicial coup’ affecting 
the process of judicial appointment.37
Both in India and Australia, there are strong constitutional provisions 
protecting the tenure of superior judges, Federal and State, by the imposition of 
the necessity of affirmative parliamentary vote for the removal of judges from 
office. In India there is a further limitation for such removal to the approval of a 
majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the House present and 
voting upon a motion alleging ‘proved misbehaviour or incapacity’.38 So severe are 
these requirements that they have rarely been invoked and most difficult to secure. 
In Australia, the power has never been invoked in the Federal sphere and has only 
once succeeded in the state sphere. 
3. Territories: Both in India and Australia, territories are generally the 
constitutional responsibility of the Federal Government, with an administrator 
appointed to be the Chief Executive.39 In the Indian case, provision was originally 
made for forms of self-government for Union territories, contemplating application 
by Goa, Daman and Diu (previously Portuguese colonies). The provision later 
extended to the territory of Pondicherry (previously a French colony). 
In Australia, self-government was successively enacted for the electors in the 
Northern Territory of Australia and the Australian Capital Territory. In each of 
these territories a unicameral legislature has been created by federal legislation. 
Although the Federal Parliament has the power to disallow legislation enacted by 
the Territory legislatures, this step has only once been taken in each case.40 In 
India, an express constitutional amendment was adopted to permit a high measure 
of self-government in the national capital territory of Delhi.41 The representation 
of the electors of the Commonwealth in the territories was expressly contemplated 
by the Australian Constitution.42 Despite two challenges; legislation for the 
37 V R Krishna Iyer J [‘Judicial coup’ in Judges Cases].
38 IC (n 1) article 124(4); AC (n 1) section 72(ii). In the Australian Constitution an ‘address’ 
to the Governor-General from both houses is required, inferentially a single majority will 
suffice.
39 IC (n 1) article 239 A; AC (n 1) section 122.
40 In the case of the Northern Territory of Australia, to disallow legislation of euthanasia, 
enacted by the Legislative Assembly. In the case of the Australian Capital Territory, to 
disallow legislation successively enacted to permit ‘civil unions’ and then ‘civil 
partnerships’ for same-sex couples.
41 IC (n 1) article 239.
42 AC (n 1) section 122 (‘May allow the representation of such territory in either House of 
the Parliament to the extent and on the terms to which it thinks fit’).
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representation of the electors in the territories in the Federal Parliament was twice 
upheld by the High Court of Australia.43
4. Common market: One of the most important provisions of the Australian 
Constitution was that which ensured that throughout the continental nation there 
would be a common single market which could not be diminished by state laws 
that imposed taxes or fiscal impediments aimed at securing local advantage. In the 
Australian case, the provision (which became one of the most litigated under the 
Constitution), s.92, declared that ‘on the imposition of uniform duties of customs, 
trade, commerce and intercourse among the states, whether by means of internal 
carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free’.44
This provision was influential in the drafting of article 301 of the Indian 
Constitution. This declared that ‘subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, 
commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free’.45
There were, of course, important textual differences between the two 
provisions. The adjective ‘absolutely’ was prudently deleted from the Indian 
text. As well, specific contemplation of the enactment of derogations was 
mentioned in the Indian case. Moreover, the derogations referred to in 
Pt XIII of the Indian Constitution were expressed in broad terms such as 
‘public interest’46 and ‘reasonable restrictions’.47 Notwithstanding these 
differentiations, and the practical necessity in Australia to read down somewhat 
the requirement of ‘absolutely free’, the respective provisions have been utilised 
in the development, under both constitutions, of a free market avoiding informal 
taxes whilst allowing sensible regulatory control.48 The adoption of a common 
market in both countries has been an extremely important contribution by the 
constitution and lawyers to the economic advancement of each country. 
Economic development goes hand in hand with legal, social and human 
development. The free market provisions in India and Australia have been 
extremely important for nation-building and preventing the dangers of selfish 
localism in each country.
43 Western Australia v The Commonwealth (First Territory Senators’ Case) [1975] 134 
CLR 201; Queensland v The Commonwealth (Second Territory Senators’ Case) [1977] 
139 CLR 585.
44 AC (n 1) section 92.
45 IC (n 1) article 301.
46 IC (n 1) article 302. But see article 303.
47 IC (n 1) article 304(b) but subject to a proviso.
48 See for example Automobile Transport (Rajasthan v State of Rajasthan [1963] SCC 
491, 521 (Das J) applying Duncan v State of Queensland [1916] 22 CLR 556, 573.
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5. Specially vulnerable citizens: Both in India and Australia, it was recognised 
that there were specially disadvantaged groups and individuals who might need 
extra protection under the constitution and legal differentiation for that purpose. 
The vulnerable communities were, in each case, a product of history. 
In Australia, the point of differentiation was generally race, skin colour and 
ethnic culture. In India the points of differentiation were caste, religion and 
associated prejudices. In Australia, the colonists faced opposition from the British 
Government and the Imperial Parliament in relation to their endeavours to impose 
racial differentiations that were deemed embarrassing in other British possessions. 
However, the Australian colonists insisted on a ‘White Australia’ immigration 
policy in the 19th century and much of the 20th. That policy was to last in all, 
nearly seventy years. The settlers, voting through their colonial legislatures, also 
insisted on a power to enact laws based on racial grounds and on discrimination 
against the Aboriginal people of the continent. 
In India, the points of differentiation included religious differences that were 
ultimately to result in the Partition of the former British India and an only partly 
solved problem affecting ‘certain classes’, namely ‘the scheduled castes’ and ‘the 
scheduled Tribes’ in the autonomous districts of Assam.49 In India, special 
representation for the ‘Anglo-Indian community’ was also provided for in the 
House of the People.50 
The adoption in Australia of a specific power in the Federal Parliament to 
enact laws ‘with respect to the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in 
any state, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’51 was not 
intended to be a provision for the rapid advancement of minorities by reference to 
their races. Essentially, it was intended to be a federal power to continue 
discriminatory laws on the grounds of race that had existed in colonial times. 
These included laws adverse to the rights of Aboriginal people of Australia; but 
also to Torres Strait Islanders, Pacific Islanders and people of Chinese and other 
Asian origins. The settlers believed that they were entitled to maintain a society 
similar to that built by their settler forebears. That required, so they thought, the 
power to exclude, disadvantage or expel non-Caucasian people.
Eventually, in 1967, by one of the rare alterations to the Australian 
Constitution adopted with the approval of the electors,52 the exclusion of 
authority to make laws for the Aboriginal race in any state was itself removed. 
49 IC (n 1) pt xvi, article 330.
50 IC (n 1) article 331.
51 AC (n 1) pt xxvi, section 51.
52 AC (n 1) section 128. The constitutional amendment was effected by Constitutional 
Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 (Cth) Act No 55 of 1967.
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This permitted the Federal Parliament, thereafter, to make special laws for 
people of the Aboriginal race. This was intended to be for the advancement of 
such people in Australia under federal law. Another prejudicial provision was 
wholly repealed, namely section 127 of the original Australian Constitution. 
This had relieved the federal authorities from counting the Aboriginal population 
in the national census. That provision had assumed that the Aboriginals would 
basically disappear by assimilation and that counting them was more trouble 
than it was worth.
The divisive burden of Australian constitutionalism was therefore race. In 
part, this remains the present position as recent enactments on the treatment of 
refugee applicants demonstrate. The burden in India was principally religion, 
and specifically as between Hindus and Islamic Indians. This was, in part, 
resolved by the division of the sub-continent in 1947. However, empowerment of 
special provisions for the representation and different treatment of Indian 
nationals by reference to their caste and tribe (where such special provision was 
thought necessary) was adopted. In neither the Australian nor Indian case would 
law, or a bold stroke of the constitution, remove the derisive burden on each 
society. Law, and legal discrimination, are only part of the problem. Both 
Australia and India remain today subject to special constitutional provisions 
addressed to race (in the case of Australia) and to caste and tribe (in the case 
of India).
Neither India nor Australia has resolved their deep social challenges on the 
basis of these respective constitutional provisions.53 However, those provisions 
have signalled that this is a challenge to be addressed. It is work in progress. In 
each case, it is a challenge that edits on the face of constitutional text.
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES
1. Autochthonous law: The Australian Constitution is, historically, a product 
of an Imperial statute enacted by the UK Parliament.54 In subsequent judicial 
reasoning, the High Court of Australia has declared that the true foundation of the 
sovereignty expressed in the Australian Commonwealth is the will of the 
Australian people.55 Although that will was expressed historically in referendums 
supporting the successive draft texts for the Australian Federal Constitution in the 
53 Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth [1998] 195 CLR 337.
54 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) (63 & 64 Vict c 12).
55 Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd [1985] 159 CLR 351, 441–42; Breavington v 
Godleman [1988] 169 CLR 40, 123; Leeth v The Commonwealth [1992] 174 CLR 455, 
485–86; McGinty v Western Australia [1996] 186 CLR 140, 230.
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1890s, the fact remains that it was considered necessary for the Australian colonists 
to procure the transfer of legislative power by an imperial enactment. This was 
also the way in which legislative power was transferred initially to the original 
American colonies of Great Britain and subsequently to Canada (1867), New 
Zealand (1907), South Africa (1910) and Ireland/Eire (1923). The original plan for 
India was for a similar imperial statute (New Zealand’s alteration had been by 
royal proclamation) constituting the Dominion of India,56 a plan postponed 
following the outbreak of War in 1939 until the end of hostilities.57 Eventually, it 
was given effect with the partition and independence of India in 1947.
After 1949, the character and status of the Indian Constitution was different. 
The Constitution of India begins, in its Preamble, with the assertion:
‘We, the people of India, … in our Constituent Assembly this twenty sixth day 
of November nineteen forty nine do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves 
this Constitution.’58
Inevitably, both in Australia and India, there are legal links to the preceding 
enactments of the United Kingdom Parliament. Those links are unbroken in the case 
of Australia. In the case of India they are deliberately severed by the interposition of 
the Constituent Assembly and the specification, in terms, of the source of the popular 
authority for the Indian text. Nehru and other independence leaders such as Jinnah 
were insistent on this severance. Whatever arguments can still arise in Australia 
about the Grundnorm of the Australian constitution59 there is no such doubt in the 
case of India. Politically, spiritually and textually, it is people of India.
2. Crown and republic: Consistent with this change, a fundamental feature of 
the basic structure of the Constitution of India is that it is a sovereign, democratic 
Republic.60 Australia, on the other hand, is a constitutional monarchy. By section 2 
of the Imperial Act of 1900 it is stated that ‘the provisions of this Act referring to 
the Queen shall extend to Her Majesty’s heirs and successors in the sovereignty of 
56 Government of India Act 1919 (UK); Government of India Act 1935 (UK) and Indian 
Independence Act 1947 (Imp) (10 & 11 Geo VI ch 30) section 7. See now IC (n 1) 
article 6(b) and 8.
57 IC (n 1) article 6(b), 361A(15) and 367(1).
58 IC (n 1) Preamble.
59 A ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’ legal norm or foundation of the Constitution. See J Stone, 
Human Law and Human Justice (Maitland 1965) 233–36 discussing G Radbruch’s 
Grundnorm.
60 IC (n 1) Preamble.
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the United Kingdom’.61 The oath of allegiance contained in the schedule of the 
Australian Constitution requires loyalty to the Queen ‘her heirs and successors 
according to law’.62 The oath of allegiance provided for in the Third Schedule to 
the Indian Constitution requires ‘true faith and allegiance’ to ‘the constitution of 
India, as by law established’.63
Although there had been discussion in the Australian colonies, prior to 
Federation, about adopting a republican form of government, after the model of 
the United States of America, this was not favoured by a majority, at that time. A 
proposal, by referendum, to delete references to the Queen and the Crown in the 
Australian Constitution was submitted to the electors of the Commonwealth in 
1999. It did not secure a majority vote of the electors in a single state, although the 
Australian Capital Territory voted in favour.64 Discussion concerning a republic 
on the demise of the Crown has again arisen in Australia. However, change may 
be delayed during the life of the present monarch. Many previous dominions of 
the Crown (although not all) became republics upon achieving self-government 
and independence after 1947. 
The compromise formula by which King George VI became ex officio the 
Head of the Commonwealth of Nations was invented by Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal  Nehru and was adopted at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference in 1949.65 When Dr Daniel Malan of South Africa said that such a 
division of functions was impossible in the case of a monarch who was a living 
person, Nehru replied:
Have you perhaps heard of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost?66 
Divisibility was then accepted. India, as Australia wished, remained a member 
of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. It is not properly styled the British 
Commonwealth. It is a group of independent nations most (but not all) of which 
are now republics and most (but not all) have a history of British colonial rule.67 
61 Imperial Act 1900 section 2.
62 AC (n 1) Schedule.
63 IC (n 1) Schedule III.
64 The Republican referendum was held on 6 November 1999. It resulted in a 44.74 per 
cent voted in favour; 54.40 per cent against.
65 D Fettling, ‘When Chifley Met Nehru: Compromise in the International Order’ in J 
Schultz and J Camens (eds), Commonwealth Now (59th edn Griffith Review, 2018) 68, 74.
66 Ibid.
67 For example, Mozambique and Rwanda were never ruled by Britain. Cameroon was a 
condominium as were the New Hebrides (since 1980, Vanuatu).
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India became a republic. So, later, did Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Burma 
(Myanmar) did also, although it did not apply to join the Commonwealth of 
Nations. 
The Nehru compromise, continued on the accession to the Crown of Queen 
Elizabeth II. It remains in place to this day. India remains a republic. Australia 
remains a constitutional monarchy. The monarch of the United Kingdom (and 
other realms and territories, including Australia) remains, at least at this time 
Head of the Commonwealth.
3. Evolution and freedom struggle: Whereas Australia’s emergence as an 
independent nation was gradual and substantially evolutionary, India’s was the 
result of a long and sometimes bitter struggle, involving bloodshed, the 
imprisonment of many Indian leaders and acrimony together with recriminations. 
There was some acrimony concerning particular aspects of the proposed 
Australian constitution. Most of the differences in the negotiations concerned the 
retention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Some Australian 
colonists urged termination of appeals, noting the difficulty that British officials 
including judges had with understanding federalism, a concept alien to their legal 
and constitutional system. The British negotiators, led by Joseph Chamberlain, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, considered that the Privy Council should be 
retained, in part (inferentially) to protect the large British investments in 
Australia.68 
In the end, the draft Australian Constitution submitted by the colonists was 
amended to retain appeals to the Queen in Council, including in defined 
constitutional matters. However, two exceptions were provided. There were to be 
no appeals in questions involving the limits of constitutional powers in respect of 
a contest between federal and state powers. And the Federal Parliament was 
empowered to ‘limit’ matters in which leave might be asked of the Privy Council. 
Any law providing such proposed limitations was required to be reserved for the 
personal decision of the monarch.69 Eventually, by an enactment of the Federal 
Parliament and each State Parliament and of the United Kingdom Parliament in 
1984, all remaining Australian appeals to the Privy Council were ended by the 
Australia Act 1986. 
In India, from the start of the republican instrument, the constitution provided 
for a completely independent system of courts. Indeed, it provided not only for the 
68 D Headon and J Williams, Makers of Miracles – The Cast of the Federal Story 
(Melbourne University Press 2000) 202–08.
69 AC (n 1) section 74.
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national Supreme Court70 and the High Courts of the states,71 but also for the 
appointment of subordinate courts72 and for High Courts in the Union territories.73 
It allowed no exceptions and specifically no residual right to appeal to the Privy 
Council. The important role that Court and the earlier Federal Court of India had 
played in the governance of India was brought to an end. Citation of Indian Privy 
Council and Federal Court authorities continued, as part of the seamless 
preservation of existing legal rights and duties, not otherwise affected by the 
Indian constitution. Seamlessly, the last Chief Justice of the Federal Court of India 
(Justice Sir Harital Jekisundas Kania) became the first Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of India on 26 January 1950.
4. Subject and citizen: At the time of Federation, Australians enjoyed a single 
nationality, namely that of British subject. This had also been the status of all 
persons in British India. Upon federation, both countries contemplated the 
retention of a single, undivided nationality. Upon the advent of the republic in 
India, the status of subject of the British Crown was terminated.74 Provision was 
made for the citizenship of persons born in the territory of India or either of whose 
parents had been born in that territory.75 Particular provision was made to cover 
the influx of persons whose parents or grandparents had been born in India, as 
defined by the Government of India Act 1935.76 
The status of citizenship of Australia was not expressly mentioned in its 
Constitution. No power was conferred expressly to enact a law on citizenship; but 
there were express provisions to allow the Federal Parliament to make laws in 
respect to ‘naturalization and aliens’;77 and ‘immigration and emigration’.78 
Moreover a provision for the disqualification of election to the Federal Parliament 
included any person who ‘is under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience 
70 IC (n 1) pt V, ch IV, article 124–47. See also pt V, ch VI.
71 IC (n 1) article 125–38.
72 IC (n 1) pt VI, ch VI.
73 IC (n 1) pt VIII, section 241. See also pt XVIA (‘Tribunals’).
74 Cf. Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347 (HL). The defendant was a 
US citizen but held a British passport. After the outbreak of war in 1939 between Great 
Britain and Germany, Joyce broadcast talks in English hostile to Britain. His conviction of 
treason was upheld despite his assertion of termination of his status as a British subject. 
Cf. now in Australia Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1209 concerning section 44(i) of the 
AC (n 1).
75 IC (n 1) article 5.
76 Ibid article 6(a) and (b). See also article 7.
77 AC (n 1) section 51(xix) 71.
78 AC (n 1) section 51 (xxvi).
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or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights 
and privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power’.79 
The first mention of Australian citizenship appeared in a 1948 federal 
statute.80 Until much later, Australians travelling overseas carried a passport 
declaring they were a ‘British subject and Australian citizens’.81 It was by the 
provisions of the Indian Constitution, and local law, that Australians and 
Indians for the first time in 1950, in the case of most, obtained a different 
nationality status. Determined to carve out different, distinctive and local 
citizenship, India originally went in a direction different from Australia. 
However, subsequent Australian legislation proceeded to catch up. It dropped 
references to the status of ‘British subject’ and, for the future, removed the 
privileged treatment that United Kingdom citizens had essentially enjoyed 
equivalent to the rights of Australian citizens.82 In this matter, India led the 
way. Australia followed as it ought to assert, and provide for, its separate 
nationhood.
5. Fundamental rights: It is not quite true to say that the Australian 
Constitution contains no provisions for the protection of the fundamental rights 
of those living under its protection. Thus, a number of express provisions protect 
the right to enjoy just terms on the acquisition of property under federal law;83 
and the right to trial by jury in certain federal criminal matters.84 Moreover, 
non-discrimination against residents of different states is guaranteed;85 as is the 
free exercise of any religion and invalidation of establishing a religion, imposing 
religious observance or obliging religious tests to be applied as a qualification to 
specified offices.86 There are also implied protections in the Australian 
Constitution against laws interfering with free speech, essential to the attainment 
of the democratic system established by the Constitution.87 Additionally, there 
are implied guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality that have been 
79 AC (n 1) section 44(i).
80 Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth).
81 Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship and the Centenary – Inclusion and Exclusion in 
20th Century Australia’ (2000) 24 Melb U L Rev 576, 582–88.
82 Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391.
83 AC (n 1) pt xxxi, section 51.
84 AC (n 1) section 80.
85 AC (n 1) section 118.
86 AC (n 1) section 116.
87 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] 189 CLR 520.
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spelt out from the separate constitutional treatment of the Judicature.88 It has 
also been repeatedly said that the Constitution impliedly demands observance of 
the rule of law.
However, the foregoing list constitutes a meagre collection of rights when 
contrasted with those in the Indian Constitution. Emphasising their importance, 
‘Fundamental Rights’ are collected in Pt. III of the Indian Constitution. They 
include the rights to equality; to freedom; to protection against exploitation; to 
freedom of religion; and to cultural and educational rights.
The foregoing provisions, followed immediately by pt IV of the Indian 
Constitution (‘Directive Principles of State Policy’), indicate more clearly the way 
in which that charter is designed to enlarge and protect the rights of natural and 
legal persons in India. By way of contrast, the Australian document basically 
leaves the protection of such rights to the enactments of the Parliament, on the 
assumption that (being regularly democratically elected) it will safeguard the 
provision of fundamental rights to those subject to its enactments. 
Unfortunately, much experience shows that, whilst an elected legislature is 
generally well placed to protect and respond to pressure from majorities and 
powerful interests, it is not necessarily so well organised (or inclined) to protect 
vulnerable and unpopular or comparatively powerless minorities.89 The 
recognition that this was so explains the adoption of the United States 
constitutional Bill of Rights and similar provisions in virtually all national 
constitutions drafted in the 20th century. The Australian Constitution, having 
originated in the 19th century, reflects a somewhat naive faith in the legislature 
that sometimes needs to be supported, stimulated and provoked by the 
intervention of courts, tribunals and officials. The Directive Principles of State 
Policy in the Indian Constitution copied an idea borrowed from the Irish 
Constitution of 1923. It is the early drafting and duration of the Australian 
Constitution that explains why it is largely bereft of express provisions protecting 
fundamental rights and desirable policies. The Canadian Constitution has now 
been supplemented by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In New 
Zealand, general human rights laws have been enacted based on international 
88 AC (n 1) ch III. See R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society [1956] 94 CLR 254; cf. 
IC (n 1) article 50 (Separation of Judicial from Executive Power).
89 The Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth [1947] 74 CLR 31, 82; Plaintiff 
S157/2002 [2003] 211 CLR 476, 513 [103]; Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales 
[2001] 205 CLR 399.
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treaty law, as has also happened in the United Kingdom, the original source of 
hostility to such provisions.90
The South African Constitution has now embedded large and novel provisions 
as to basic rights.91 It now contains substantial statutory protections of fundamental 
rights. However, an attempt to insert various protections against state laws in the 
Australian Constitution failed in 1988. Two legislative attempts and many 
proposals for a federal statute of fundamental rights in Australia have failed to 
attract federal parliamentary support. The usual explanation given is that such 
laws would create activist judges; politicise the judiciary; diminish the legislature; 
and are not needed in a democratic society.
6. Protection of religious freedom: Although, as stated, the Australian 
Constitution does contain some provisions for the protection of freedom of religion, 
the language of s.116 of the Australian Constitution has been given a very narrow 
reading by the High Court of Australia. Although in one case the court defined 
religion broadly, emphasising a universal spirituality over a particular religious 
doctrine,92 in another, a majority of Justices gave the prohibition on the 
‘establishment’ of religion an extremely narrow meaning.93 That meaning was 
suggested to be, essentially, to prevent any religion being given the status of the 
established state religion, as enjoyed by the Church of England in the United 
Kingdom. Because any such risk had receded following the earliest days of 
Australian colonisation, this was an interpretation that ignored the background of 
history against which the Australian Constitution had been written. It also failed to 
give the guarantee any functional work to do. Yet such work was necessary to 
prevent the abuse of political power by religious organisations and the effective 
imposition of religious beliefs upon persons who did not share those beliefs, 
especially when done at public expense. 
This was a necessity appreciated by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, dealing with substantially the same language contained in the First 
90 Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ). See further G Palmer and M Palmer, Bridled Power, 
New Zealand Government Under MMP (OUP 1987) 229–31, 265; Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK).
91 For example, provisions forbidding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
and providing for economic social and cultural rights (right to healthcare, housing, etc.).
92 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) [1983] 154 CLR 120.
93 Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Black v The Commonwealth (Defence of Government 
Schools Case) [1981] 146 CLR 559; Luke Beck, Religious Freedom and the Australian 
Constitution (Routledge 2018).
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Amendment to that country’s constitution.94 In the United States, strict limits 
have been imposed on public financial support for religious institutions.95 In 
Australia, direct subventions to organised religious bodies to support their schools 
and other institutions have been upheld. So too have been provisions to support 
religious events and celebrations (like World Youth Day).96 
7. Secularism: In India, the divisions between Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist 
members of the population and Islamic adherents erupted into bloody conflict 
during the Partition in 1947–49. That action followed the decision to create two 
successor states to the Dominion of India, namely India and Pakistan. That terrible 
period of conflict has had no parallel in Australia where, until recently, the 
overwhelming majority of the population identified as Christian, although divided 
into denominations often reflecting traditional animosities and rivalries. Even 
these divisions have been reduced in importance in recent decades in Australia 
with the decline in church attendances by the population and the increasing 
number of Australian citizens responding to the national census question that they 
have ‘no religion’ (currently about 20 per cent). 
The commitment to a ‘secular’ republic in the Preamble to the Constitution of 
India confirms that, unlike Pakistan, the Indian State has no official religion. The 
Preamble is part of the Constitution of India. It asserts that the state makes no 
discrimination on the grounds of religion. Reinforcing this ideal, article 25 of the 
Constitution declares that ‘all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience 
and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion being available to 
all religions equally’. This provision has been viewed as conducing to secularism. 
The specific relevance to the active engagement of professing, practising and 
propagating religion has been held to take the protection of the Indian provision 
beyond holding or believing particular aspects of religious faith or doctrine.97 The 
right to communicate beliefs has held not to include a right to forcible instruction 
or conversion.98 Limits are specifically spelt out on the imposition of taxes, the 
proceeds of which are appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or 
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.99 Nor may 
94 Lemon v Kurtzman 403 US 602 [1971]. See also Everson v Board of Education of 
Ewing (1947) 330 US 1.
95 Larkin v Grendel’s Den Inc [1982] 459 US 228.
96 Defence of Government Schools Case (n 93).
97 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] 4 SCC 225.
98 Commission for Hindu Religious Endowment v Lakshmindra [1954] SCR 1005; 
Stainslaus v State of MP [1977] SC 908.
99 IC (n 1) article 27.
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religious instruction be provided within any educations institution ‘wholly 
maintained out of state funds’.100 This last provision contrasts with a practice that 
crept into some colonial laws during the 19th century in Australia, by which 
‘special [religious] instruction for one hour a week’ was permitted in publicly 
funded schools.101 This ‘compromise’ continues to be followed in most parts of 
Australia more than a century later. In some states parents and children can opt 
out of such denominational religious instruction.102 
Although in India the affirmative protection of ‘freedom of conscience’ and 
the free ‘practise … of religion’ does not extend expressly to ‘freedom from 
religion’, i.e. the entitlement to be free from propagation or practice of religious 
beliefs, such a freedom is inherent in secularism. It involves reading down the 
religious entitlements of some people so as not to be inconsistent with the religious 
and non-religious entitlements of others.
The secular character of government, enshrined expressly in the Indian 
Constitution and partly expressly and partly implicitly in the Australian 
Constitution are amongst the most valuable characteristics of the respective 
governmental qualities, derived from the general tradition of the United Kingdom 
and its laws. In Australia, because of the narrow interpretation of the prohibitions 
in s.116 of the Australian Constitution, controversial decisions have sometimes 
upheld contested taxation advantages for religious institutions.103 With the growth 
of the political influence of faith organisations, associated with particular religions, 
in both India and Australia, it must be expected there will be more challenges to 
the ambit of constitutional guarantees and prohibitions on the grounds of religion 
in coming years.
8. Judicial appointment and retirement: Initially, the Australian Constitution 
made no provision for the retirement for the Justices of the High Court of 
Australia or other federal courts, once appointed. This omission was interpreted 
by the High Court of Australia to imply that, as in the United States, federal 
judges were appointed for life. In the Australian colonies and later the states, 
legislation provided for the retirement of judges. The retiring ages differed, 
100 IC (n 1) article 28.
101 The Education and Training Reform Act 2006, section 2.2.11.
102 See for example Public Instruction Act 1880 (NSW) sections 17–18.
103 Federal Commissioner for Taxation v Word Investments Pty Ltd [2008] 236 CLR 204 
in which a taxation advantage for a religious organisation, whose objectives included the 
propagation of religion, was extended (over the writer’s dissent) to a funeral business. See 
Word Investments 252, [124]. The legislative provision was subsequently corrected to 
reflect the minority view.
THE AUSTRALIAN AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONS, SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
37
mostly according to the status of the court to which the judge was appointed. 
Most State Supreme and District Court judges served to age seventy 
(in Victoria 72). Magistrates and some Industrial Court Judges served to age 
sixty-five. In recent years, these retiring ages have been increased in the 
Australian States and Territories to age seventy-two and in some cases (with 
approval of the Chief Justice) to age seventy-five. 
The introduction of a power to enact an age of retirement for federal judges 
was addressed in an amendment to the Australian Constitution adopted following 
the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977. That alteration expressly 
provided, in respect of Justices of the High Court, that future appointees could 
serve until attaining the age of seventy years. It was left to the Parliament to decide 
the maximum age of retirement for other federal judges, although the maximum 
was later enacted as seventy years.104 
The term of appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court of India lasts ‘until 
he attains the age of sixty-five years’.105 The term of a judge of a State High Court 
is until he attains the age of sixty-two years.106 These are very low judicial 
retirement ages by comparison with most countries. They are influenced by the 
provisions formerly applicable to the judiciary in colonial times and in the 
Dominion of India where most of the judges, before 1935, were British officials 
who returned ‘home’ on pensions after the completion of their judicial service. 
There appears to be no good reason of principle why such early retirements 
should continue to be imposed in India. This is particularly so given the Indian 
tradition (not observed in Australia) of invariably appointing as Chief Justice the 
judge next in seniority to the retiring incumbent. That tradition has itself meant 
that many chief justices of India have served extremely short periods of time 
because of the inevitable proximity of their 65th birthday. Suggestions have 
occasionally been made for the adoption of later retirement ages for the Supreme 
and High Courts, but with no avail. Inferentially, the political consensus has not 
been present to permit the amendment. 
No difficulties have followed Australian State provisions for the extension for 
the normal service of superior court judges. Nor have difficulties arisen from the 
removal of life tenure and the substitution of attaining seventy years, in the case of 
federal judges. Life tenure restricts the regular and desirable turnover of high 
officeholders appropriate to an age of rapid technological and social change. 
Extending judicial service in India to sixty-eight or seventy years would appear to 
be a sensible means of avoiding wastage of valuable, accumulated, judicial 
104 AC (n 1) section 72 (paras 2, 3 and 4 inserted 1977).
105 IC (n 1) article 124(2).
106 Ibid. 
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experience with no commensurate return. I express this opinion as one who is in 
favour of judicial retirement as a means of ensuring change in the enjoyment of all 
public offices, given the desirability of reflecting generational change in the 
community that is served. 107
9. Emergency provisions: There is no express provision in the Australian 
Constitution for the suspension of the Parliament or any other constitutional 
institution and the substitution of emergency rule. Nor has any such emergency 
been authoritatively suggested to interrupt the operation of the Constitution. 
Various national security regulations and specific laws were enacted in Australia 
during the two world wars.108 However, these were an application of the 
Constitution, not an interruption of it. 
Views have been expressed in Australia that a power to invoke a ‘special 
emergency prerogative lies dormant in the fabric of executive powers [in the 
Australian Constitution]. It has been suggested that such a prerogative awaits 
activation in the face of extreme necessity.’109 Another assertion has been made 
of an extraordinary prerogative which extends to the assumption of legislative 
power when the legislative arm of government is paralysed. In recent years, the 
enactment of laws on anti-terrorism has greatly enlarged the executive power in 
Australia concerning terrorism.110 In a majority decision anti-terrorism 
legislation enacted by federal and state governments and introduced after 2002 
was upheld over my dissent.111 Justice Hayne joined in rejecting the assertion 
that the defence power, provided under the Australian Constitution, was enlarged 
to afford the federal government a constitutional foundation for military and 
naval defence for domestic purposes. I considered that such a view was 
incompatible with the constitutional text and with the strong earlier decision of 
the High Court of Australia in Australian Communist Party v The 
Commonwealth.112 In that decision the court insisted that neither the Government 
nor the Federal Parliament could ‘recite’ itself into constitutional power simply 
by asserting a danger in a statute.113
107 IC (n 1) article 217. Initially this provided for retirement at age sixty. This was extended 
following the Constitution, Fifteenth Amendment Act 1963 (In) section 4.
108 H P Lee, Emergency Powers (Law Book Co 1984) 322. See also M Head, Emergency 
Powers in Theory and Practice – The Long Shadow of Carl Schmitt (Ashgate 2016) 211.
109 Ibid 171–72.
110 Thomas v Mowbray [2007] 233 CLR 307.
111 Ibid (Gleeson CJ, Gummow J, Callinan J, Heydon J and Crennan J).
112 Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] 85 CLR 30.
113 Ibid 187 (Dixon J).
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In the Indian Constitution, express provision is made for the proclamation of 
an emergency.114 The precondition for such a proclamation is the satisfaction 
of the President of India ‘that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of 
India, or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, either by war or 
external aggression [armed rebellion]’.115 Such a proclamation is only to last for 
a maximum period of six months.116 Further provisions are made for a case of 
satisfaction by the President of ‘a situation … in which the government of the 
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution’.117
Despite the suspension and enforcement powers provided for in these 
provisions, the ordinary operation of the Constitution of India has been maintained 
with few interruptions. Most importantly, the military forces have avoided 
intrusion into civilian government which has been such a feature of many post-
colonial nations.
10. Amendment provisions: Finally, it is appropriate to mention the very 
different amendment provisions provided for in the Australian and Indian 
Constitutions. 
The Australian provision was copied from a model derived from Switzerland.118 
For a formal amendment to the text of the Constitution, a proposed law for the 
alteration must have passed with an absolute majority through each House of the 
Parliament. It must then be submitted to the electors in each state and territory of 
Australia. A referendum must then be held. The law may not be presented to the 
Governor-General for the Royal Assent unless a double majority of the electors 
voting is secured. There must be a majority of the national vote in favour of the 
proposed law and a majority in favour recorded in a majority of the states of 
Australia (i.e. in four of the six states).119 
These provisions have proved extremely challenging for those who have 
proposed changes to the Australian Constitution. In the 117 year history of the 
Australian Commonwealth, there have been 44 proposals for the amendment of 
the Constitution. Only 8 of these have succeeded. In the case of some proposals, 
114 IC (n 1) article 352.
115 Ibid.
116 IC (n 1) article 252(5).
117 IC (n 1) article 35.
118 AC (n 1) section 128.
119 A R Blackshield and G Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (6th edn 
Federation Press, 2014) 1338. Of the eight proposals that secured the double majority 
requirement in AC (n 1) section 128, seven of them won majorities in every state.
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where the suggested amendment has been submitted successfully two or three 
times, the experience has been that the proposal has been lost again, usually with 
an increased majority of opponents. Similarly, analysis has shown that if the 
double majority requirement were removed and it were sufficient to secure a 
national majority for alteration and a majority in three of the six states, the number 
of referendums that would have been adopted would not have been increased. 
Constitutionally speaking, Australia is therefore a nation where it is extremely 
difficult to secure a formal amendment to the Constitution. Only possibly the 
United States of America has a constitutional amendment requirement in which it 
is more difficult to succeed. 
Given the huge population of India, its many unique challenges, the responsibilities 
imposed on its institutions of government, for such a large segment of humanity, and 
the perils that accompanied its emergence to nationhood as well as the length and 
detail of the constitutional text it is not surprising that the provisions for amendment 
of the Constitution should have been markedly simpler and more flexible. A power is 
granted to the Parliament of India, to add to, vary or repeal ‘any provision of this 
constitution’120 in accordance with the provisions laid down. The general requirement 
is that the Bill proposing the amendment must be passed in each House of Parliament 
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and 
voting.121 Certain special provisions are made in the case of certain amendments. 
And it is declared ‘for the removal of doubts’ that ‘there shall be no limitation 
whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, 
variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article’.122
Notwithstanding the last mentioned emphatic provision, and the purported 
prohibition on any court calling into question an amendment passed in accordance 
with the article,123 the Supreme Court has repeatedly held the privative clause 
excluding judicial review to be incompatible with the Indian constitutional scheme 
as to the distribution of powers.124 The court has determined, on the contrary, that 
the ‘amendment’ power is subject to the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution 
because an amendment must leave sufficient of that which is ‘amended’ in place in 
order to be ‘amendment’. It must not be characterised as an overthrow of the 
Constitution as a whole.125
120 IC (n 1) article 368(1).
121 IC (n 1) article 368(2).
122 IC (n 1) article 368(5).
123 IC (n 1) article 368(4).
124 Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR [1975] SC 2299.
125 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR [1973] SC 1461 [292], [437], [555]–[575], 
[599], [664]–[665], [691]. See also [251]–[252] (Khanna J).
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In Australia, the importance attached throughout the life of the Constitution 
to the judicial power in Ch III of the Constitution might conceivably invite 
similar reasoning, in the event of a relevant challenge.126 For example an attempt 
to change the Australian Constitution from a constitutional monarchy to a 
republic might possibly fail, unless the change was approved by the electors in 
every jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. This is because each constituent part of 
the Australian Commonwealth is itself a constitutional monarchy. Accordingly, 
an amended Commonwealth that was partly republican and partly monarchical 
might be held antithetical to the scheme of the ‘alteration’ of something so basic. 
This question has not yet been considered by the High Court of Australia. But 
the ‘basic structure doctrine’ in the context of the Indian Constitution, affords 
food for thought.
It is not surprising that the Indian and Australian constitutions were so 
basically similar and that the inevitable differences in their provisions can be 
confined to specifics. After all, until 1935, India was moving towards full dominion 
status in the British Empire as Australia had earlier done. The four pillars still 
standing in the forecourt of Secretariat Building in New Delhi conformed to 
Lutyens grand scheme and his instructions. Those pillars honour Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. India was planned to be next. Inevitably 
the Constituent Assembly, drafting the India Constitution, drew on the earlier 
drafts. So there remain many strong constitutional similarities. Their existence 
should encourage greater knowledge and awareness in both India and Australia of 
our shared constitutional heritage, so that we continue to learn from each other. 
CLOSING REFLECTION: OUR BETTER ANGELS
1. Race: I have reviewed some of the main points of similarity and difference 
between the Indian and Australian Constitutional documents. However, before 
parting from this subject, I will visit two particular topics to show the ways in 
which, sometimes, the interpretation of constitutional principles can take a wrong 
turning or a right turning. Of course, whether it is ‘wrong’ will usually depend on 
differing opinions. Objective error may not become clear for decades or even 
longer, if ever. 
Constitutional texts and doctrine, being expressed in words, will often be 
ambiguous. My teacher of jurisprudence, Professor Julius Stone, insisted that 
judges have ‘leeways for choice’127 in declaring the correct law. Especially so in 
126 Boilermakers’ Case [1956] 94 CLR 254, 267, 270–74.
127 J Stone, Social Dimensions of Law Justice (Maitland 1966): a view propounded by 
Karl Llewellyn.
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constitutional law where the language is often opaque and the values at stake so 
contestable. Stone urged that, in the choices they made, judges should be 
transparent and honest in the reasoning they offer in justification. Sometimes in 
making the choices the judges’ lesser angels will prevail. At other times their 
‘better angels’128 will gain the upper hand.
Every constitutional court or decision-maker is challenged from time to time 
by cases presenting particular issues. It is the nature of constitutional law that it 
will often raise contests about fundamental questions going to the very heart of 
the governance of the people. Where those questions concern particular 
minorities in the nation’s population they demand a special wisdom on the part 
of the decision-makers. This is true in India as it is in Australia. In these closing 
remarks, I refer to two special areas in which Australian constitutional decision-
making has presented difficult questions for decision by the apex court. Similar 
issues can arise in India. Accordingly, where relevant, I will refer to Indian 
instances. 
I begin with the issue of race. The history of the 20th century demonstrated, 
in many places, the deep wells of prejudice and hostility that can arise concerning 
racial minorities, including in constitutional adjudication. It happened many 
times in the United States in relation to the African-American minority.129 
Likewise it has arisen in relation to Hispanic-American and Japanese-American 
nationals.130 Later decisions significantly redressed the prejudice and 
discrimination evident in the earlier decisions. The ‘better angels’ of race came 
to the fore.131
In India, having in colonial times been subjected to unequal treatment on the 
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth, it was unsurprising that 
the rights to equality, covering all of these grounds were expressly included in the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.132 Discrimination on the basis 
of race, caste, sex and place of birth remained a serious issue in independent India. 
However, from the beginning of the Indian Constitution, strong protections were 
provided.
128 Shakespeare, Sonnet No 144 (1599). Cf. A Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 3 March 
1861.
129 Scott v Sandford (Dred Scott Case) [1857] 60 US 393; Loving v Virginia [1967] 388 
US 1.
130 Hirabayashi v United States [1943] 320 US 81; Korematsu v United States [1944] 323 
US 214.
131 See for example Brown v Board of Education [1954] 347 US 483; Griggs v Duke 
Power Co. [1978] 438 US 59.
132 IC (n 1) article 15.
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This was not so in the case of the Australian Constitution. There was no 
acknowledgement of the Aboriginal minority (although they were the First Peoples 
and numbered between 1 and 2 per cent of the population). Originally they were 
not counted in the census of the population.133 They were largely ignored and 
substantially deprived of civil rights essential for economic well-being, specifically 
to their land rights. 
A great Indian jurist indirectly played a beneficial part in suggesting a novel 
remedial approach to this problem. In 1988, Justice P N Bhagwati, who had 
served as Chief Justice of India, chaired a meeting in Bangalore, India, in which 
I participated. The meeting adopted principles that addressed humanity’s ‘better 
angels’ in a clear and practical way; but also a legal way. The Bangalore 
Principles on the Domestic Application of Universal Human Rights Norms, 
adopted at the conclusion of that meeting, suggested that, where there was 
ambiguity in the state of the law, a court should prefer the meaning or expression 
of the law that conformed to international human rights norms to one that did 
not.134 No differentiation was drawn between constitutions and other varieties 
of law. 
It was essentially this principle that was invoked by the High Court of Australia 
in the Mabo decision in 1992.135 In that decision on the common law of Australia, 
the majority of the High Court of Australia re-expressed the land law of Australia 
so as to recognise, for the first time, the rights of indigenous people to traditional 
title to their lands. Such recognition would be given where the traditional rights 
had not already been alienated to third parties as freehold or other inconsistent 
title.136 This was an important legal step forward for the indigenous people of 
Australia. So was the later apology to them given in the Federal Parliament by 
Prime Minster Kevin Rudd.137 The constitutional text itself had been amended in 
1967 to remove language that impeded the power of the Federal Parliament to 
enact laws favourable to the Aboriginal people.138 
133 AC (n 1) section 127.
134 The Bangalore Principles are annexed to M D Kirby, ‘The Role of the Judge in 
Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International Human Rights Norms’ (1988) 62 
ALJ 514, 531–32.
135 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] [1992] 175 CLR 1, 42.
136 Wik Peoples v Queensland [1996] 187 CLR 1.
137 The national apology to the Indigenous Australians was delivered in the House of 
Representatives of the Australian Parliament on 13 February 2008 by Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd. It was supported by the leader of the opposition, Brendan Nelson, The Age 
(Melbourne) 13 February 2008 and Hansard (H of R) ibid.
138 Amending AC (n 1) pt xxvi, section 51 (xxvi).
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In 1998, a question arose as to whether the amended constitutional provision 
would, in its terms as amended, support new federal legislation that was arguably 
seriously adverse to the legal rights of Aboriginal objectors.139 Naturally, the 
attention of the justices of the High Court of Australia deciding the case, focused 
on the language of the legislative power given to the federal parliament. Following 
the amendment by referendum in 1967, the relevant power was to make laws with 
respect to:
‘(xxvi.) The people of any race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make 
special laws: …’140
The argument for the Federal Government, supporting the challenged 
enactment, was that there was no ambiguity. A law limiting, restricting or 
diminishing the rights of Aboriginal citizens was still a law ‘with respect to the 
people of any race for whom it had been deemed necessary by the federal 
parliament to make special laws’.141 They must take the good with the bad. 
Otherwise every favourable enactment would be effectively constitutionalised. It 
could not be amended because any change arguably unfavourable would fall 
outside the power of amendment. I acknowledged this difficulty in my reasons. 
However, both for textual and contextual reasons, I concluded that it would be left 
to the courts to decide whether any particular enactment fell within power. The 
textual support lay in the use of the words ‘for whom’. This did not mean ‘with 
respect to’ whom because when the Australian constitution intended that ambit, it 
said so specifically, as it did not the opening words of section 51 granting legislative 
power. The contextual elements were even stronger. The amendment to the 
Constitution (one of the few which had secured the approval of the electors) was 
achieved against the background of the political and popular endorsement of a 
commitment to improving the legal, social and economic status of Aboriginal 
people. It was not intended to support laws unfavourable to their interests. At least 
it should not be so interpreted. In support of that approach, I invoked the 
‘interpretative principle’ expressed in Mabo,142 reflecting the Bangalore Principles 
of 1988. As stated in Mabo,143 one rule upon which the international law on human 
rights had been firm and unanimous was that laws should not be interpreted where 
another interpretation was available, that prejudiced individuals on the basis of 
139 Kartinyari v The Commonwealth [1998] 195 CLR 337.
140 AC (n 1) section 51 (xxvi).
141 Ibid.
142 Mabo v Queensland [No.2] [1992] HCA 23, 175 CLR 1.
143 Ibid.
THE AUSTRALIAN AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONS, SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
45
their race. In utilising the new power afforded by the large ambit of section 51(xxvi.) 
of the Australian Constitution, the terms of the grant of power should not be 
construed to sustain an adverse enactment144 my view was a minority one. The 
majority upheld the power to enact legislation that was undoubtedly adverse and 
arguably discriminatory.
This case illustrates the importance in constitutional adjudication of the 
choices that fall to judges who enjoy the power and responsibility of decision-
making. Especially at the level of an apex court, decision-making in such cases is 
rarely cut and dried. Inevitably constitutional values, sometimes illuminated by 
universal human rights, will have a part to play.
2. Sexual orientation: An issue that was not generally discussed in polite legal 
circles at the time of the drafting of the Australian or Indian constitutions has 
lately arisen before many constitutional courts of the world including in India and 
in Australia. I refer to the issue of discrimination, violence and criminalisation of 
a hitherto frightened and silent minority defined by reference to the sexual 
orientation and gender identity (LGBTIQ).145
The reasons for the silence about this minority can be traced to a small number 
of now contested passages in scripture, specifically the Jewish and Christian 
Bibles (and the Holy Koran). On the basis of these passages British administrators, 
ignoring any pre-existing views as to the ambit of criminal law, imposed serious 
criminal penalties on persons who were convicted of same-sex activity. Such 
activity attracted, upon conviction, grave punishment (originally including the 
death penalty), allegedly because of the wrath of God towards those guilty of such 
conduct. The fact that ‘the offence’ occurred in private, between persons of full 
age and competence, and although they were consenting, was deemed irrelevant 
and provided no legal defence. Such provisions were universal throughout the 
British Empire. In the Indian Penal Code (IPC)146 the provision appeared in s.377 
in an otherwise astonishing legal achievement, it rendered indelible the 
stigmatisation of a significant population of the Indian people. It was a relic of 
colonial thinking. Yet, although it was abolished in the land of its origin in 1967147 
144 Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22, 195 CLR 337.
145 LGBTIQ stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex or otherwise queer 
persons.
146 Drafted by Thomas Babington Macauley in 1937; enacted for the Governor-General’s 
Council in 1860; entered into force in 1862.
147 Sexual Offences Act 1967 (UK).
46
and in all Australian states by 1998,148 no effective steps have been taken by the 
Indian Parliament to repeal s.377. This is so, despite the increasing and worldwide 
knowledge of the scientific characteristics of sexual variation and the strong 
statements of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations determining 
that such laws were inconsistent with universal human rights.149
In the face of legislative inactivity in India, proceedings were brought in the 
court to challenge the constitutional validity of the impugned provision. Indian 
citizens and community organisations commenced proceeding in the court 
committing that s.377 of the IPC was invalid because it violated articles 14, 15 and 
21 of the constitution. The arguments suggested that the section invaded the most 
private consensual activities of adult citizens; was contrary to the protections of 
life, dignity, autonomy and privacy provided by article 21 of the Constitution; and 
violated the constitutional guarantee of equality under article 14 of the Constitution; 
infringing also article 15 because sexual orientation was a ground analogous to 
sex, a protected category under the Constitution of India.
In the Delhi High Court a declaration was made by Chief Justice A P Shah and 
Justice Muralidhar (constituting the court), that s.377 IPC, so far as it criminalised 
consensual sexual acts of adults in private, breached articles 14, 15 and 21 of the 
Indian Constitution. The court held that the terms of section 377 had to be read 
down so as to be confined in their operation to the constitutionally permitted ambit 
left over by the operation of the Constitution. In a most impressive judicial opinion, 
the Delhi High Court held:
If there is one constitutional tenet that can be said to be an underlying theme 
of the Indian Constitution, it is that of ‘inclusiveness’. This court believes that 
the Indian Constitution reflects this value deeply engrained in the Indian 
society, nurtured over several generations. The inclusiveness that Indian 
society traditionally displayed, literally in every aspect of life, is manifest in 
recognising the role in society for everyone. Those perceived by the majority 
as ‘deviants’ or ‘different’ are not on that score excluded or ostracised. Where 
148 When the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), sections 122 and 127 were repealed in 1998. 
This followed the enactment by the Federal Parliament of Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) 
Act 1994 (Cth) which in turn followed Toonen v Australia [1994] 1 Int Hum Art Rt Reports 
97 (No 3), decision of the UN Human Rights Committee. See Croome v Tasmania [1998] 
191 CLR 119.
149 Ibid. There have been many other decisions of national and international courts on this 
topic, most of them favourable to the provision of protection and equality. See M D Kirby, 
Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity – A New Province of Law for India (Universal Law 
Publishing 2015).
THE AUSTRALIAN AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONS, SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
47
society can display inclusiveness and understanding, such persons can be 
assured of a life of dignity and a life of non-discrimination.… It cannot 
be forgotten that discrimination is the antithesis of equality and that it is the 
recognition of equality that will foster the dignity of every individual.150
The decision and orders in the Naz Foundation case151 were appealed to the 
Supreme Court of India. On 11 December 2013, that court, constituted by two 
Justice Bench in Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation,152 upheld the appeal 
despite the orders of the Delhi High Court and confirmed the validity of section 
377 IPC. It thereby effectively ‘re-criminalised’ millions of LGBTIQ Indian 
citizens and others. The outcome caused dismay in national and international 
circles. But the most disappointing features of the decision lay in the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court. It had been delayed for a long interval and was delivered at the 
last moment, before the retirement of one of the justices. It was dismissive of the 
appeal to constitutional rights, which it was the duty of the court to determine. It 
referred to those rights as ‘so-called’ claims by the gay minority. It opined that 
determination of the matter was for parliament not the courts. This was despite the 
fact that no action had been taken to afford (or even consider) legislative change. A 
curative petition to allow consideration of the decision in Koushal was brought, 
but has not yet been determined, although that petition is still alive. Meantime, in 
another matter coming before the court in the Justice Puttaswamy case153 Dr 
Justice D Y Chandrachud,154 (after citing passages about the ‘so-called rights of 
LGBT persons’) stated:155 
Neither of the [stated] reasons can be regarded as a valid constitutional basis 
for disregarding a claim based on privacy under article 21 of the Constitution. 
That ‘a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, 
gays, bisexuals or transgenders’ as observed in the judgment of this Court is 
not a sustainable basis to deny the right to privacy. The purpose of elevating 
certain rights to the stature of guaranteed fundamental rights is to insulate the 
150 Naz Foundation v Union of India [2009] 4LRC 835 [130]–[131]; [2009] 1 DLT 277 
(Del HC).
151 Ibid.
152 Koushal v Naz Foundation [2014] 2 LRC 555; [2013] 15 SCALE 55; [2014] 1 SCC 1.
153 Justice Puttaswamy, (unreported) 24 August 2017 (Petition) 494/2012. The manuscript 
of the Supreme Court judgment comprised 547 pages.
154 With whom Kehar CJ, Agrawal J and Nazeer J conferred. Nariman J, Kaul J, Robde J, 
Sapre J, Chelameshwar J wrote concurring reasons.
155 Puttaswamy v Union of India [2017] 10 SCC 1 (Justice KS).
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exercise from the disdain of majorities, whether legislative or popular. The 
guarantee of constitutional rights does not depend on their exercise being 
favourably regarded by majoritarian opinion. The test of popular acceptance 
does not furnish a valid basis to disregard rights which are conferred with the 
sanctity of constitutional protection. Discrete and insular minorities face grave 
dangers of discrimination for the simple reasons that their views, beliefs or 
way of life does not accord with the ‘mainstream’ yet in a democratic 
Constitution founded on the rule of law, their rights are as sacred as those 
conferred on other citizens to protect their freedoms and liberties. Sexual 
orientation is an essential attribute of privacy. Discrimination against an 
individual on the basis of sexual orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity 
and self-worth of the individual. Equality demands that sexual orientation of 
each individual in society must be protected on an even platform. The right to 
privacy and the protection of sexual orientation lie at the core of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. 
The view in Koushal that the High Court had erroneously relied upon 
international precedents ‘in its anxiety to protect so-called rights of LGBT 
persons’ is, similarly, in our view, unsustainable. The rights of the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender population cannot be construed to be ‘so-called rights’. 
The expression ‘so-called’ seems to suggest the exercise of a liberty in garb of a 
right which is illusory. This is an inappropriate construction of the privacy based 
claims of the LGBT population. The rights are not ‘so-called’ but are real rights 
founded on sound constitutional doctrine. They inhere in the right to life. They 
dwell in privacy and dignity. They constitute the essence of liberty and freedom. 
Sexual orientation is an essential component of identity. Equal protection demands 
protection of the identity of every individual without discrimination.156
There were other criticisms of Koushal157. Because an appeal in that matter (or 
the curative petition) was not before the Supreme Court, it withheld relief and left 
this to a later time. However, given that in the Privacy Case158 the Supreme Court 
of India was comprised of a Constitutional Bench of nine justices, it would appear 
to be a decision favourable of the eventual restoration of the orders in the Naz 
Foundation159 case. 
Most respectfully, I express the hope that this would be so. I would do so as a 
jurist, simply looking at the reasoning in Koushal and the Privacy Case. However, 
156 Privacy Case (n 139) [126], [127] (Justice Puttaswamy).
157 Privacy Case (n 139) [152].
158 Privacy Case (n 139) [155].
159 Privacy Case (n 139) [150].
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I can add to those ingredients, my own experience as a member of the LGBT 
population in my own country. Being on the receiving end of discrimination 
whether on the ground of race or sexual orientation is affronting, demeaning and 
sometimes dangerous. There have always been members of the sexual minorities 
in the legal and judicial profession. Until recently, for safety, they were frightened 
into silence. Now they are emerging into the full light. Part of that light is shone by 
judges, like those of the Supreme Court of India participated in the Privacy Case. 
In constitutional adjudication, judges often have choices. Those choices are 
illuminated by their constitutional values. Those values can be informed by 
evidence, including scientific; international human rights law; and the reasoning 
of judicial colleagues in analogous circumstances in other jurisdictions.
This is why comparative constitutional law is such a valuable tool of the 
modern judge and advocate. Fortunately modern technology, the internet and 
access to information undreamed of by our predecessors is now available to us. 
Australian lawyers can definitely learn from Indian judges and lawyers.
Constitutions are special laws. Fidelity to their origins and purposes will often 
require distinctive approaches. The world today, including the world of 
constitutional law operates in a universe of internationalism. Where it is permitted 
by the text and encouraged by the purpose and context of the issue in question, 
even constitutional law can learn from international developments. Nowhere is 
this more so than in universal human rights, that belong to all people everywhere, 
are in question.
